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In search of timely credit risk indicators : 
a view of the current crisis from a 
market-implied ratings perspective
Introduction
An important challenge for financial authorities in avoid-
ing  a  future  level  of  financial  distress  equal  to  that 
experienced in the current crisis will be to identify and 
assess  risks  to  financial  stability  in  an  accurate  and 
timely manner. Such a task requires the collection of a 
wide range of information, as well as the development 
of appropriate analytical tools, such as financial stabil-
ity  indicators  and  early  warning  signals.  Among  these 
should be indicators of banks’ default probabilities and 
credit risk, since monitoring and managing credit risk in 
the financial system is of crucial importance for finan-
cial stability. Such indicators should have the following 
characteristics. First, they should provide a timely signal 
of  imminent  increases  in  credit  risk.  The  timeliness  of 
the signal is of crucial importance as this determines the 
ability to maintain financial stability or to limit emerging 
portfolio losses. Second, changes in credit risk indicators 
should signal changes in credit risk and not other factors 
that are unrelated to credit risk. This will help to avoid 
false alarms or a false sense of confidence. Finally, a third 
characteristic of credit risk indicators should be a certain 
degree of stability in times when credit risk is unchanged.
In their search for indicators that possess these charac-
teristics and in order to obtain a broader assessment of 
banks’ credit risk, financial authorities complement con-
fidential  supervisory  information  with  publicly  available 
information, such as long-term ratings provided by rating 
agencies and market prices (e.g. CDS spreads). However, 
the events in the current crisis have raised questions about 
risk indicators. In particular, rating agencies are blamed for 
not having noticed the build-up of risk in the system and 
for reacting only when it was too late. Similarly, markets 
are considered to have severely underpriced risk in the 
run-up  to  the  crisis,  raising  substantial  doubt  concern-
ing the efficient markets hypothesis. In addition, market 
prices (such as CDS spreads) are known to reflect factors 
other than credit risk, such as market liquidity, investors’ 
risk aversion or general market sentiment.
This raises the question of the usefulness of these signals 
for  macro-prudential  supervision.  The  likely  answer  is 
that there is merit in knowing the markets’ perception of 
credit risk, at least under the condition that the credit risk 
information is accurately filtered out from the other infor-
mation in market prices. Instruments that are claimed to 
possess this characteristic are the so-called market-implied 
ratings (MIRs), which are constructed by combining infor-
mation  from  market  prices  and  long-term  ratings,  and 
which have recently been introduced by rating agencies 
as market-based indicators of credit risk. According to the 
rating agencies, MIRs offer a timely, accurate and easily 
interpretable representation of market-based information 
on  the  credit  quality  of  the  issuer  of  the  rated  instru-
ment. In particular, MIRs are claimed to isolate changes 
in risk for individual issuers from the noise of the markets   
(see e.g. Moody’s, 2009). For these reasons, MIRs appear 
to be actively used by central banks, financial institutions 





In this article, we provide a critical assessment of MIRs. In 
particular, we investigate whether these indicators offer a 
more precise measure of credit risk than other credit risk 
indicators (for instance CDS spreads) and whether infor-
mation about credit risk is incorporated into one type of 
MIR more quickly than in the other (CDS-implied ratings 
versus  equity-implied  ratings)  or  than  in  market  prices 
(CDS spreads).
We use daily data on MIRs from a major rating agency 
for a sample of 30 large European and US banks covering 
the period 2005-2009 to compare the behaviour of CDS-
implied ratings (CDSIRs) and equity-implied ratings (EIRs) 
as well as CDS spreads. To our knowledge, we are the first 
to provide this type of critical assessment of MIRs. As our 
sample period covers both the run-up to the current crisis 
and the main events that have occurred during the crisis, 
we are able to exploit the large variation in the data to 
provide some basic insights on these market-based indica-
tors of credit risk. As a consequence, we also contribute 
to the growing literature that studies the events of the 
current crisis and their consequences. 
Our  analysis  suggests  that  MIRs  are  unlikely  to  fully 
overcome  the  deficiencies  of  their  underlying  compo-
nents (long-term ratings and market prices). Instead, the 
changes in MIRs seem to reflect movements in the under-
lying market prices which appear to be related to factors 
other than credit risk, such as market liquidity, investors’ 
risk aversion or general market sentiment. In particular, 
the behaviour of MIRs obtained from the CDS market and 
those obtained from the equity market is not always simi-
lar. That is, the relationship between CDSIRs and EIRs is 
time-varying. In addition, the two types of MIRs also seem 
to differ somewhat in their relationship to CDS spreads. 
Finally, while we find that during the crisis period, move-
ments in CDS spreads often lead movements in CDSIRs 
as one would expect, there is no clear leading-lagging 
relationship between CDSIRs and EIRs. 
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. In 
Section 1, we compare market-implied ratings to more 
traditional indicators of credit risk (CDS spreads and long-
term  ratings).  In  Section  2,  we  describe  our  data  and 
examine the general behaviour of the credit risk indicators 
over time. In Section 3 we consider the contemporane-
ous relationship between CDSIRs, EIRs and CDS spreads 
in order to determine to what extent the two types of 
MIRs  appear  to  be  equivalent  measures  of  credit  risk. 
Section 4 presents a preliminary discussion regarding the 
lead-lag relationship between our market-based metrics 
of credit risk. Finally, in Section 5 we summarize our main 
conclusions and outline an agenda for future research on   
the topic.
1.  Market-implied ratings compared 
with other indicators of credit risk
MIRs  are  a  new  type  of  credit  rating  that  has  been 
recently  introduced  by  rating  agencies  (see  e.g.  Fitch 
Ratings  (2007a,b),  Moody’s  (2007)  and  S&P  (2009)). 
These ratings aim to combine the pure credit risk focus 
and stable nature of long-term ratings with the timeli-
ness  of  information  provided  by  market  prices  (CDS 
spreads, equity prices, bond prices etc.).  (1) For instance, 
CDS-implied ratings (CDSIRs) are derived by combining 
credit information obtained from CDS spreads and long-
term  ratings.  Similarly,  equity-implied  ratings  (EIRs)  are 
obtained by first using techniques to extract credit risk 
information contained in equity prices (such as default 
probabilities  estimated  on  the  basis  of  a  Merton-type 
Box 1  –  Methodology of market-implied ratings 
In this box, we describe in general terms the methodology used by rating agencies to extract credit risk information 
from market prices and construct equity-implied and CDS-implied ratings.
While the specifics of the methodologies applied by the rating agencies to obtain MIRs show some differences, 
the general idea is always the same. In particular, the rating agencies consider a reference sample of firms sorted 
by the firm’s long-term rating. Given this sample of firms, the methodologies consist of three steps : (1) obtain 
credit risk information from market prices for each firm in each long-term rating category, (2) obtain boundaries 
between adjacent rating categories, and (3) determine each firm’s MIR. 
4
(1)  CDS are credit derivatives that function like a traded insurance contract in which 
a protection buyer accepts to pay a periodic fee (called “spread” or “premium”) 
in exchange for a payment by the protection seller in the case of a credit event 
(bankruptcy, failure to pay, …) on a reference entity.163
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structural  credit  risk  model),  then  mapping  the  credit 
risk information into ratings. Box 1 gives more details on 
the methodology used by the major rating agencies for 
constructing  CDSIRs  and  EIRs  (due  to  data  availability, 
this article does not consider another type of MIR, bond-
implied ratings). 
Two key characteristics of MIRs are the following. First, 
in  contrast  to  market  prices  and  long-term  ratings, 
MIRs are a relative measure of credit risk (in the cross-
sectional  dimension).  For  instance,  if  all  firms’  CDS 
spreads  (or  Merton-type  PDs)  were  to  double  ceteris 
paribus, this would have a very limited or even no impact 
(depending on the credit rating agency considered) on 
the distribution and the level of MIRs because all the 
boundaries  that  separate  the  different  market-implied 
rating categories would double as well. Therefore, hold-
ing long-term ratings constant, changes in a firm’s MIR 
indicate relative under- or outperformance of the firm in 
terms of CDS spreads (or Merton-type PDs) compared to 
other firms in the sample. 
Second, as MIRs are updated daily following changes in 
market prices, they may in principle vary on a daily basis. 
However, in practice, daily changes are not observed. This 
is due to at least three reasons. First, as just explained, for 
given long-term ratings, a firm’s MIR will likely not change 
when it performs in a similar way as its peers in terms of 
StEp	1	:	Obtain	cREDit	RiSk	inFORmatiOn	FROm	maRkEt	pRicES
For CDS-implied ratings, the relevant credit risk information is simply the (smoothed) CDS spread of the firm. For 
equity-implied ratings, a proxy for the firm’s default probability (PD) is extracted from equity prices using some 
Merton-type structural model of credit risk.
StEp	2	:	Obtain	bOunDaRiES	bEtWEEn	aDjacEnt	RatinG	catEGORiES
In general, the level of the credit risk implied by market prices is expected to be larger for lower long-term rating 
categories ; CDS spreads (or Merton-type PDs) of AA firms are generally larger than CDS spreads (or Merton-
type PDs) of AAA firms, and so on for lower rating levels. To allow a mapping from the market-based credit risk 
information to a MIR for each firm in the sample, cut-off points in terms of the credit risk information marking 
the boundaries between each long-term rating category are calculated. These cut-off points are not fixed in time, 
i.e. they usually move together with the observations on the credit risk information obtained from market prices 
within each long-term rating category. For instance, when a substantial number of observations within one or both 
of two adjacent rating categories see their relevant measure increasing, the boundary separating the two rating 
categories will increase as well.  (1)
StEp	3	:	DEtERminE	EacH	FiRm’S	miR
A firm is assigned a MIR on the basis of where its credit risk observation is situated compared to the boundaries 
separating the different long-term rating categories. For a firm to have its MIR equal to its long-term rating, the 
firm’s observation on the credit risk information (CDS spread or Merton-type PD) should be situated within the 
boundaries of the credit risk information for its long-term rating category. A firm outside the boundaries of its 
long-term rating category is assigned the MIR that is equal to the long-term rating within the boundaries of which 
the firm’s observation of the credit risk information is situated. 
To illustrate, consider for instance a two-scale long-term rating system (AAA and AA) and assume that the CDS 
spread level that is calculated as the boundary between AAA and AA rated firms equals 10 basis points (bp). This 
implies that firms with a CDS spreads below 10 bp will have a CDSIR of AAA, and those with a CDS spread above 
10 bp will have a CDSIR of AA.
(1)  Depending on the rating agency and MIR considered, the sample of firms used to determine the boundaries may consist of all firms rated by the agency across 
sectors and geographic regions, or some segmentation of firms by e.g. sector and geographic location. Also, boundaries may be updated more or less frequently 
depending on the agency and the type of MIR.164
the CDS spread or Merton-type PD, even when move-
ments in market prices are large. Second, if a firm does 
under- or outperform the other firms in the sample, this 
relative under- or outperformance should be sufficiently 
large in order to cross the boundaries separating the dif-
ferent rating categories. Third, for given CDS spreads or 
Merton-type PDs, MIRs may also change due to changes 
in long-term ratings. However, long-term ratings change 
very infrequently, and hence, will not result in frequent 
changes in MIRs. All this implies that MIRs, while reflect-
ing market information, nevertheless offer some stability 
to their users. 
Besides these two key characteristics, MIRs also possess a 
number of desirable features. First, MIRs are expressed in 
the familiar ranking ranging from AAA for the most cred-
itworthy firms to C for the firms with the highest credit 
risk. Consequently, MIRs are based on a scale that facili-
tates comparison of credit risk for different firms. Second, 
as MIRs incorporate market information, they may signal 
changes in credit risk in a more timely manner than long-
term ratings do. In addition, because MIRs combine two 
sources  of  information  (long-term  ratings  and  market 
prices), they may also provide a more complete view on 
credit risk than either source of information alone. Finally, 
and perhaps most important, MIRs may be a more precise 
and stable measure of credit risk than market prices, since 
their aim is to isolate changes in credit risk for individual 
issuers from other information in markets prices. In fact, 
MIRs were created with the objective of capturing disa-
greements between long-term ratings and market prices 
and to give a clean measure of credit risk. Hence, at face 
value, MIRs seem to possess all the characteristics of a 
“good” credit risk indicator identified in the introduction 
(timeliness, accuracy and stability). 
A natural question is therefore whether MIRs could poten-
tially be more useful for measuring credit risk than more 
traditional credit risk indicators, such as long-term ratings 
or market prices. For example, could MIRs potentially be 
used  as  a  complement  to  supervisory  information  for 
monitoring emerging risks in the financial sector ? 
An important argument for such a use is that, in contrast 
to MIRs, traditional credit risk indicators do not seem to 
possess all the desirable features identified in the intro-
duction. More precisely, these indicators seem to trade-
off between accuracy and stability on the one hand, and 
timeliness on the other, in identifying emerging credit risk.
In particular, whereas long-term ratings, which represent 
the  rating  agencies’  views  on  credit  risk,  are  supposed 
to have a pure credit risk focus and a through-the-cycle 
nature that is intended to provide stability to the measure, 
their major drawback is that, because of this through-the-
cycle nature, they adjust more slowly than market prices to 
changes in risk, as illustrated by the current crisis. Market 
prices, on the other hand, embody market participants’ 
views on credit risk and may provide more timely signals 
of financial stress since they quickly react to the available 
information  on  changes  in  credit  risk.  However,  market 
price movements are likely to also reflect other factors that 
may be unrelated to credit risk, such as market liquidity, 
investors’ risk aversion or general market sentiment. This 
is not only true for equity prices, which in general may be 
expected to depend on all factors that affect the firm’s 
future profitability (both upside and downside), but also 
for credit default swaps.  (1) Therefore, even though CDS in 
principle closely relate to credit risk and are considered to 
be a purer measure of credit risk than equity prices, CDS 
spreads may only be a noisy signal of credit risk.
Given the apparent desirable properties of market-implied 
ratings and the shortcomings of market prices, it is inter-
esting to investigate in more details whether the former 
offer a more precise measure of credit risk than the latter, 
and whether information about credit risk is incorporated 
into one type of market-implied ratings more quickly than 
in the other (CDS-implied versus equity-implied ratings) 
or than in market-prices (CDS spreads). In the remainder 
of the article, we provide a first attempt to shed light on 
these issues. 
2.  General behaviour of MIRs and  
CDS spreads 
In  this  section,  we  describe  the  evolution  of  average 
CDSIRs, EIRs and CDS spreads for a sample of European 
and  US  banks  during  the  period  2005-2009.  We  also 
provide some summary statistics on the variation in these 
variables for individual banks. 
Our data consists of a sample of 30 banks, of which 20 
are European and 10 US-based and for which CDSIRs, 
EIRs,  and  5-year  senior  CDS  spreads  are  available  over 
the period 1 January 2005 to 31 December 2009. This 
period covers both the run-up to the current crisis as well 
as several major events during the crisis. The banks in the 
sample were required to have at least 150 observations 
per year for each of the three data series. In addition, we 
dropped banks for which one of the data series is missing 
for at least 10 consecutive trading days.  (2) 
(1)  See e.g. Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001), Bongaerts et al. (2010) and Annaert et al. 
(2010). 
(2)  We impose this criterion to reduce errors caused by the choice to replacing 
missing observations by moving forward the last observation. If too many obser-
vations are missing, by replacing them in this way, the series would no longer 
be representative. Moreover, for some banks, there were long periods with no 
observations during the crisis and the series pre- and post-crisis did not longer 
refer to same legal entity. 165
iN SEarCh OF TimEly CrEdiT riSk iNdiCaTOrS : a viEw OF ThE 
CurrENT CriSiS FrOm a markET-impliEd raTiNgS pErSpECTivE
The central component of our data is a unique dataset 
on daily MIRs for financial institutions, which, together 
with  the  institutions’  long-term  credit  ratings,  were 
obtained  from  a  major  credit  rating  agency  (Moody’s).   
As mentioned in the previous section, MIRs essentially are 
credit ratings derived from market prices and long term 
ratings. That is, they are expressed in the familiar ranking 
ranging from AAA for the most creditworthy firms to C 
for the firms with the largest credit risk.  (1) However, as 
they incorporate information provided by market prices, 
they change more frequently than long-term ratings do. 
In particular, the average number of changes in CDSIRs 
per year for each individual bank in our sample over the 
period  2005-2009  amounts  to  almost  33.  The  corre-
sponding number for EIRs equals about 23, whereas the 
long-term rating of the banks in our sample only changes 
less  than  1  time  per  year  on  average.  These  figures 
confirm that, while being more volatile than long-term 
ratings, MIRs are much more stable than market prices, 
which may be a desirable property.
As  mentioned  above,  we  examine  the  relationship 
between the two types of MIRs and compare their behav-
iour relative to CDS spreads. We therefore also obtained 
daily data on 5-year senior CDS spread for our sample 
banks from Datastream. Note that we do not consider 
equity prices in our analysis because they are not, from a 
theoretical point of view, a “pure” measure of credit risk, 
as they incorporate information on the “upside” of profit-
ability as well as the “downside”. 
2.1  Initial comparison of the credit risk indicators
Chart  1  compares  the  historical  evolution  of  average 
CDSIRs, EIRs and CDS spreads across the banks in our 
sample.  For  comparison,  we  also  plot  the  evolution  of 
the average long-term rating for the banks in our sample. 
We can immediately observe significant variation in these 
series over the sample period. In fact, the average CDS 
spread  across  all  banks  has  an  overall  mean  of  89  bp 
and ranges from a minimum of 10.8 bp to a maximum 
of 453.2 bp. The overall means of the average CDSIRs 
and EIRs across the banks in our sample amount to 14.9 
and  13.3 ;  these  numerical  values  correspond  to  rat-
ings between A and A-, and A- and BBB+, respectively. 
























(numerical rating) (right-hand scale)
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Sources  : Own calculations based on data from Moody’s and Datastream.
(1)  CDS spreads are mid-prices expressed in basis points (bp). The scale for CDS spread is inverted and appears on the left axis. CDSIRs, EIRs and long-term ratings have been 
transformed to a numeric scale that appears on the right axis : AAA=20, AA+=19, AA=18, AA-=17, A+=16, A=15, A-=14, BBB+=13, BBB=12, BBB-=11, BB+=10, BB=9, BB-=8, 
B+=7, B=6, B-=5, CCC+=4, CCC=3, CCC-=2, CC and below=1.
(1)  In the analysis, we transform these rating classes into numerical values between 
20 for the most creditworthy banks and 1 for the least creditworthy ones: 
AAA=20, AA+=19, AA=18, AA-=17, A+=16, A=15, A-=14, BBB+=13, BBB=12, 
BBB-=11, BB+=10, BB=9, BB-=8, B+=7, B=6, B-=5, CCC+=4, CCC=3, CCC-=2, 
CC and below=1.166
Average CDSIRs fluctuated between a minimal value of 
10.7 (BBB-) and a maximal value of 17.6 (AA) ; the cor-
responding values for the average EIR across the banks in 
our sample amount to 9.6 (BB+) and 17.9 (AA), respec-
tively. Finally, average long-term ratings showed substan-
tially less variation, ranging from 15.8 (A+) to 17.6 (AA), 
around a mean value of 16.8 (AA-).
Overall, the market-based metrics in Chart 1 react in a 
much stronger way to the events occurring during the 
crisis than long-term ratings do. However, the behaviours 
of CDSIRs and EIRs do not always seem to coincide. For 
instance, in the period before July 2007, CDSIRs are quite 
stable  while  EIRs  increase  significantly.  In  addition,  the 
two series in fact move in opposite directions in October 
2008. The different behaviour observed in the two MIRs 
may be due to specificities in the construction of MIRs.  (1) 
However,  it  may  also  be  the  case  that  these  measures 
are not necessarily driven by individual credit risk alone, 
but, like CDS spreads or equity prices, may also reflect 
non-credit  risk  related  factors  such  as  market  liquidity, 
investors’  risk  aversion,  or  general  market  sentiment. 
Finally, while showing some differences in the evolution of 
the three market-based metrics of credit risk, the plotted 
series in Chart 1 do not allow strong conclusions to be 
drawn regarding the lead-lag behaviour of the different 
metrics.
Looking at Chart 1 in more details, three main periods can 
be distinguished : before the crisis (up to July 2007), the 
crisis period up to government interventions (from July 
2007 up to September 2008), and the crisis period after 
government interventions (after September 2008).
The credit risk indicators in Chart 1 would seem to indi-
cate that credit risk in the banking sector was stable at a 
relatively low level (or even decreasing) over the period 
from 2005 to mid 2007. In particular, average long-term 
ratings  are  stable  at  levels  between  A+  and  AA-  and 
CDS  spreads  remain  fairly  constant  at  levels  below  50 
bp until June 2007. The same is true for average CDSIRs, 
which are relatively stable around a level close to AA-. 
Interestingly, even though they are supposed to measure 
credit risk in a similar way, average EIRs show a some-
what different behaviour ; starting at a level close to A- at 
the beginning of our sample period, they show a strong 
but gradual upward trend, closing the gap with CDSIRs 
towards early 2007.
This observed pattern of EIRs closing the gap with CDSIRs 
is actually very similar to the behaviour of equity prices 
of the banks in our sample ; while CDS spreads remain 
fairly constant in this period, equity prices (as shown in 
Chart A1 in the appendix) show a clear upward trend until 
June 2007. The behaviour of the CDSIRs and EIRs there-
fore seems to suggest that these measures pick up move-
ments in the underlying price series that are not necessar-
ily related to individual credit risk but rather reflect factors 
such as bank profitability or general market sentiment. 
During the crisis period (starting in July 2007 with the 
negative  disclosures  on  subprime  credit  risk  of  Bear 
Stearns’ hedge funds), all market-based metrics (CDSIRs, 
EIRs, CDS spreads) significantly drop  (2), probably due to 
increased investor concern about banks’ exposure to sub-
prime mortgages. The plotted series in Chart 1 give the 
impression that MIRs signal the start of the crisis some-
what earlier than CDS spreads do.  (3) Although long-term 
ratings also gradually decline after the start of the crisis 
in July 2007, the market-based metrics indicate a much 
more pronounced increase in the level of credit risk. This is 
particularly true for the periods when the most important 
negative events of the crisis took place : e.g. Bear Stearns’ 
hedge fund closures in July 2007, Bear Stearns’ takeo-
ver in March 2008, Northern Rock in September 2007 
and  February  2008,  the  Icelandic  banks,  Fannie  Mae, 
Freddie Mac, AIG and Lehman Brothers (among others) in 
September 2008. These episodes would seem to indicate 
that the market-based metrics signal a large increase in 
credit risk. However, to the extent that MIRs reflect move-
ments in the underlying price series which are unrelated 
to changes in credit risk for individual institutions, their 
significant drops, like CDS spreads, may also reflect fac-
tors such as a steep contraction of the risk appetite of 
market participants. 
In  October  2008,  following  various  government  inter-
ventions,  CDSIRs  show  a  significant  jump  upwards  (+3 
rating notches, from BBB- to A on average). CDS spreads 
also  improve,  while  EIRs  seem  to  move  in  an  opposite 
direction. These movements are consistent with similarly 
opposite movements observed in CDS spreads and equity 
prices during the same period ; however, they are incon-
sistent with the idea that EIRs and CDSIRs both measure 
credit  risk.  Potential  explanations  for  the  contrasting 
movements in CDS spreads and equity prices have been 
provided by market participants and researchers ; i.e., that 
the government interventions benefited creditors and CDS 
protection sellers at the expense of shareholders.  (4) That 
is, whereas capital injections increase the loss absorption 
(1)  Specificities in the mapping of market prices into the traditional rating scale may 
result in a different behaviour of CDSIRs and EIRs. One example of this may be 
the use of a different sample of firms used in the construction of CDSIRs than for 
the construction of EIRs; as MIRs reflect a bank’s relative credit risk compared to 
the other firms in the sample (see Box 1), a different reference sample of firms 
may result in a different behaviour of the bank’s MIRs.
(2)  CDS spreads in non-reverse scale increase.
(3)  Although MIRs are constructed from the underlying price series, the possibility 
that MIRs lead the movements in prices cannot be ruled out due to specificities in 
the construction of MIRs. For a more detailed explanation, we refer to Section 4.
(4)  See e.g. Panetta et al. (2009) and King (2009).167
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buffer before creditors are hit, existing equity holders are 
worse off, since their share in the capital of the firm is 
diluted. However, this should not have affected the credit 
risk signals obtained from EIRs, which, as explained above, 
are constructed with the purpose of extracting credit risk 
information from the other drivers of equity prices. The 
opposite reaction of EIRs compared to CDSIRs provides 
additional support for the observation that CDSIR and EIR 
movements do not always coincide and seem to follow 
similar patterns as the underlying CDS spreads and equity 
prices. This suggests that the credit risk signals provided 
by MIRs may be distorted by other determinants of the 
underlying price series. 
Despite the government interventions, the upward jump 
in  CDSIRs  was  later  followed  by  a  strong  downward 
correction,  and  CDS  spreads  (inverted  scale)  and  EIRs 
reached their lowest values in March 2009. The decline in 
equity prices (Chart A1 in the appendix) and consequent 
contraction  in  the  risk  appetite  of  market  participants, 
together with the increase in CDS spread volatility, may 
have  caused  a  contraction  in  CDS  transactions  and  a 
consequent increase in CDS spreads from October 2008 
to  March  2009,  despite  the  government  interventions. 
This movement seems to be followed by the MIRs, which 
decline during this period. From March 2009 onwards, 
MIRs and CDS spreads seem to have entered a recovery 
period,  which  is  more  pronounced  for  the  CDS-based 
measures than for EIRs.  (1) The three market-based indi-
cators of credit risk are nevertheless still at substantially 
worse levels than before the crisis. Long-term ratings seem 
to be still in a downward movement, which together with 
their more gradual decline during the crisis, may reflect 
their  through-the-cycle  nature.  This  more  gradual  and 
continuing decline in long-term ratings limits the poten-
tial for MIRs to quickly revert to higher levels ; since MIRs 
are constructed from long-term ratings, this may be an 
explanation as to why CDS spreads seem to indicate the 
recovery after March 2009 earlier than the MIRs. 
2.2  Bank-level variation in the credit risk indicators
Table 1 provides a summary of some bank-level statistics 
on  the  ranges  (i.e.  differences  between  maximum  and 
minimum values) of CDS spreads and MIRs for individual 
banks over the sample period and the maximal observed 
daily  difference  between  EIRs  and  CDSIRs  during  the 
period.
The  first  row  of  Table  1  indicates  that  for  the  median 
bank, the CDS spread varied over a range of 268.8 bp. 
The bank with the lowest variation saw its CDS spread 
cover  a  range  of  55.2  bp,  whereas  the  bank  with  the 
highest variation experienced a range of almost 3000 bp. 
These  statistics  show  that  there  were  significant  differ-
ences across the banks in the sample with respect to the 
variation in their CDS spreads during the period.
Table 1 also reveals significant variation for banks’ CDSIRs 
and  EIRs.  For  the  median  bank,  the  CDSIRs  varied  by 
8 notches over the period and the median range of EIRs 
was  11  notches.  The  bank  with  the  largest  range  for 
CDSIRs over the period saw a difference of 14 notches, 
and the bank with the largest range of EIRs experienced a 
difference of 19 notches.
Finally,  we  consider  the  maximum  observed  daily  dif-
ferences  between  banks’  EIRs  and  CDSIRs  during  the 
period. For the median bank, the maximum daily differ-
ence (in absolute value) observed during the period was 
8.5 notches. The bank reporting the greatest maximum 
difference between the two ratings saw a difference of 
14  notches.  In  other  words,  on  some  day  during  the 
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(1)  Equity markets’ movements in the second quarter of 2009 (see Chart A1 in the 
appendix) reflect growing confidence that the worse of the crisis had passed.168
3.  Contemporaneous relationship 
between MIRs and CDS spreads
As explained above, MIRs are claimed to filter out changes 
in credit risk for individual issuers from other information 
embodied in market prices. If MIRs succeed in doing so, 
they  could  potentially  offer  more  precise  measures  of 
credit risk than CDS spreads. However, the discussion in 
the previous section already suggests that this may not be 
the case. As empirical evidence regarding the factors that 
affect MIRs does not exist, the existing literature does not 
provide us with an answer to the question of whether 
MIRs reflect other factors than credit risk.  (1) Whereas such 
an analysis is beyond the scope of this article, we never-
theless provide a first step. In particular, if MIRs indeed 
succeed  in  filtering  out  credit  risk  signals  from  market 
prices, then MIRs based on different market prices should 
provide very similar signals regarding the credit risk of an 
institution and exhibit similar relative behaviour over time. 
We investigate this more in detail here, using two com-
plementary approaches. First, we analyze the behaviour of 
the average value of the ratio of banks’ EIRs over CDSIRs 
over the sample period. Second, we examine correlations 
between changes in banks’ EIRs and CDSIRs as well as 
correlations between EIRs and CDS spreads, and between 
CDSIRs and CDS spreads.
3.1  Ratio of EIR over CDSIR
Chart 2 plots the daily average across banks of the ratio 
of the EIR over CDSIR for each bank. As suggested above, 
one  might  expect  that  MIRs  should  provide  the  same 
signal regarding the intensity of credit risk at all times. 
However,  this  may  not  necessarily  be  the  case  for  a 
number of reasons. First, it may be that, for reasons relat-
ing to the computation of MIRs, the default probability 
associated with a AAA CDSIR may not be the same as the 
default probability implied by a AAA EIR. However, we 
would nevertheless expect CDSIRs and EIRs to move in a 
similar manner over time for each bank, such that their 
ratio equals some constant. Second, to the extent that 
different markets (CDS versus equity) incorporate credit 
risk information at different speeds, we would not expect 
the ratio of EIRs over CDSIRs to be equal to a constant at 
all times. However, deviations from this constant should 
not be persistent, in that the ratio of EIRs over CDSIRs 
should revert back to its mean as soon as the credit risk 
information  is  incorporated  in  both  markets.  Persistent 
deviations from the mean value would suggest that MIRs 
do not signal potential changes in credit risk in an equiva-
lent manner. 
The line in Chart 2 shows the movement of the average 
across banks of the ratio of EIRs over CDSIRs over the 
sample period. A first observation is that this ratio is not 
constant over time ; whereas the mean over the entire 
sample period of the average ratio of EIRs over CDSIRs 
equals 0.91 (which, with a standard deviation of 0.10, is 
CharT  2  avERaGE	RatiO	EiR	OvER	cDSiR	FOR	SamplE	OF	30	bankS
Average ratio of EIR over CDSIR
Significantly different from mean value























Sources  : Own calculations based on data from Moody’s.
(1)  See reports on MIRs from rating agencies, e.g. Fitch Ratings (2007a,b) and 
Moody’s (2007) that show how the difference between MIRs and long-term 
  ratings (rating gaps) relate to default probabilities.169
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not significantly different from 1), the daily average ratios 
fluctuate between about 0.75 and 1.15. Note that these 
ratios are again daily averages across banks ; as shown 
in Table 1, differences between EIRs and CDSIRs for any 
given bank may be substantial (up to 14 notches). 
To  see  whether  these  fluctuations  are  the  result  of  the 
different  speeds  with  which  different  markets  incorpo-
rate  credit  risk  information,  we  test  whether  deviations 
from the mean value for the ratio over the sample period 
(0.91)  are  significant  and  persistent.  We  proceed  as  fol-
lows :  for  each  time  period,  we  perform  a  t-test  to  see 
whether  the  average  ratio  of  EIRs  over  CDSIRs  across 
the 30 banks in our sample equals 0.91. The grey areas 
in  Chart  2  indicate  at  which  point  in  time  the  average 
ratio  of  EIRs  over  CDSIRs  is  significantly  different  from 
0.91.  Although  the  test  indicates  that  EIRs  and  CDSIRs 
were  providing  similar  credit  risk  signals  in  the  run-up 
and, to a lesser extent, during the first part of the crisis   
(January  2008-September  2008),  in  several  periods  both 
before and during the crisis the deviations from 0.91 were 
significant, indicating that EIRs and CDSIRs were actually 
providing different (credit risk) signals in these episodes. In 
addition, these periods of disagreement seem relatively per-
sistent, sometimes covering several weeks or even months. 
The period before the crisis, up to October 2006, is the 
period where average EIRs were closing the gap with aver-
age CDSIRs, similarly to equity prices versus CDS spreads. 
Interestingly, as can be observed from Chart A1 in the 
appendix, the other periods where the different behaviour 
of EIRs and CDSIRs is statistically significant (August 2008 ; 
October 2008-December 2008 ; early 2009) correspond to 
periods in which the movements in equity prices and CDS 
spreads for the banks in our sample diverge the most. For 
instance, the period after the collapse of Lehman Brothers 
in  September  2008,  was  characterized  by  several  stan-
dalone  support  actions  for  large  individual  institutions, 
both in Europe and the US. As more and more financial 
institutions became affected by the crisis, many countries 
announced  comprehensive  rescue  packages  involving 
some combination of recapitalizations, debt guarantees 
and asset purchases. 
3.2  Rolling correlations between CDSIR and EIR
In  this  section  we  provide  an  analysis  of  correlations 
between CDSIRs and EIRs. More specifically, we look at 
six-month rolling correlations between daily changes in 
these variables.  (1) We analyze correlations in changes in 
the MIRs rather than in the rating levels since results are 
qualitatively similar but the graphs and the interpretation 
of  the  results  for  changes  are  clearer.  In  particular,  we 
expect the correlation between changes in CDSIRs and 
changes in EIRs to be positive, as increases (decreases) in 
both ratings should signal an improvement (a deteriora-
tion) in the creditworthiness of issuers. 
CharT  3  avERaGE	Six-mOntH	ROllinG	cORRElatiOn	bEtWEEn	cDSiR	anD	EiR	FOR	SamplE	OF	30	bankS
Average correlation between CDSIR and EIR
Significantly different from zero

















Sources  : Own calculations based on data from Moody’s.
(1)  The six-month rolling correlations are calculated as follows: for each bank the 
correlation between the changes in the variables is calculated over a window 
period of six months and the calculation is then repeated by moving ahead the 
sample period of an increment of one day. This means that for each six-month 
period after the first one, the earliest observation is dropped from the calcula-
tion and the most recent one is added in, again to have a correlation over six  
months. Rolling analysis is commonly used in time series analysis to assess the 
stability of a certain relationship over time. 170
Chart  3  plots  the  daily  average  across  banks  of  the  six-
month rolling correlations between changes in CDSIR and 
changes  in  EIR,  calculated  for  each  bank.  The  grey  area 
indicates  periods  for  which  these  averages  of  six-month 
correlations  are  significantly  different  from  zero.  Given 
that changes in the CDSIR and the EIR for a given bank 
should move in the same direction, we would expect the 
correlation  of  changes  to  be  positive.  A  first  observation 
from  the  chart  is  that  the  correlation  between  the  two 
series  is  rather  low,  ranging  from  about  –0.02  to  0.09.   
A likely reason for this is that we look at correlations between 
daily  changes  in  CDSIRs  and  EIRs ;  as  MIRs  change  with   
a relatively low frequency (see Section 1.1), the correlation 
between  daily  changes  cannot  be  expected  to  be  high.   
A check of the correlations of weekly changes in CDSIRs and 
EIRs  indeed  yields  correlations  that  are  somewhat  higher, 
though still far from 1 (ranging between –0.10 and 0.20). 
A second observation from the chart is that there is sig-
nificant time-variation in the correlations between changes 
in  CDSIRs  and  EIRs.  (1)  In  particular,  whereas  until  July 
2007 the correlation was not significantly different from 
zero most of the time, at the beginning of the crisis, in 
the  summer  of  2007,  the  average  correlation  increased 
significantly.  During  almost  the  entire  crisis  period,  this 
correlation  remains  at  this  higher  level  (around  0.07).   
As the grey area indicates, the correlation is significantly 
different from zero from July 2007 up to August 2008 and 
in  the  crisis  period  following  government  interventions 
(from October 2008). Interestingly, the correlation between 
changes  in  CDSIRs  and  EIRs  is  not  significantly  different 
from zero during September 2008 ; the many crisis events 
during this month appear to have increased the variation in 
the signals provided by the two indicators. This correlation 
then increases and, towards the end of our sample period, 
seems to revert back to the lower pre-crisis levels. 
3.3  Rolling correlations between MIRs and  
CDS spread
Finally, we also consider the six-month correlations between 
changes in the two types of MIRs and CDS spreads. We 
expect a negative correlation between MIRs changes and 
CDS spread changes, as higher CDS spreads are associ-
ated with higher credit risk.
Chart  4  plots  the  average  six-month  rolling  correla-
tions  between  daily  changes  in  CDSIRs  and  changes  in 
CDS spreads, and between changes in EIRs and changes 
in CDS spreads. The grey and yellow areas indicate periods 
when the correlations are significantly different from zero.
The chart reveals that prior to the crisis (up until April 
2007), the correlations between the changes in the two 
types  of  MIRs  and  the  changes  in  CDS  spreads  were 
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Correlation between EIR and CDS spread significantly different from zero
Average correlation between EIR and CDS spread
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Source : Own calculations based on data from Moody’s and Datastream.
(1)  This is also true for weekly correlations.171
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substantially lower than during the crisis period. In par-
ticular, the correlations between CDSIR changes and CDS 
spread changes fluctuated between 0 and –0.10 before 
the  crisis.  As  observed  in  the  discussion  of  Chart  1  in 
Section 2.1, CDS spreads and CDSIRs were quite stable 
from 2005 to April 2007, which may explain the lower 
correlation in the pre-crisis period. Then, the correlations 
between changes in CDSIRs and CDS spreads fell to a 
level around –0.30 during the crisis. From March 2009 
onwards, the correlations between changes in CDSIRs and 
changes in CDS spreads are more or less stable around 
–0.20.
As for the corresponding correlations between EIR and 
CDS spreads, Chart 4 shows that the changes in these 
two credit risk measures were in fact uncorrelated (not 
significantly different from zero) before the crisis. During 
the  crisis,  the  correlations  dropped  to  significant  levels 
between  –0.10  and  –0.20.  Overall,  the  correlations 
between  EIR  changes  and  CDS  spread  changes  were 
lower (in absolute value) than those between changes in 
CDSIRs and CDS spreads over the entire sample period.  (1) 
The low values of the correlations in the contemporane-
ous changes between MIRs and between the changes in 
MIRs and CDS spreads suggest that one or more of these 
series may be leading the others. We investigate this ques-
tion in the next section.
4.  Dynamic lead-lag relationship
In this section we provide a preliminary analysis of dynamic 
relationships  between  the  MIRs  and  CDS  spreads.  We 
are interested in knowing whether there are strong rela-
tionships  between  lagged  changes  in  the  variables  and 
whether  one  indicator  may  be  leading  the  others.  For 
example, a finding that one of the indicators systemati-
cally moves ahead of the others could be interesting with 
respect  to  early  detection  of  financial  distress.  (2)  Since 
MIRs are constructed in a way that combines the issuers’ 
information from long-term ratings and from the markets, 
it is likely that CDS spreads lead changes in the implied rat-
ings. However, the possibility of changes in MIRs leading 
credit spreads cannot be ruled out completely. In particular, 
as explained above, MIRs are relative measures of credit 
risk.  This  implies  that  a  bank’s  MIR  can  change  before 
its market underlying market price does for at least two   
reasons. First, for given long-term ratings of the firms in 
the reference sample used to construct the MIRs, a strong 
movement in the (credit risk information obtained from) 
market prices of (a substantial number of) other firms in 
(1)  The corresponding correlations in weekly rather than daily changes range 
between –0.20 and –0.60 for CDS spreads and CDSIRs, and between 0 and 
–0.30 for CDS spreads and EIRs. Daily changes therefore result in lower correla-
tions, but qualitative results are again similar for weekly changes.
(2)  Studies from the academia and rating agencies show that while the CDS market 
leads the bond market, the evidence on the lead-lag relationships between the 
















CDS spreads CDSIR 16 3 9 2
CDS spreads EIR 6 6 3 15
CDSIR EIR 0 3 0 27
  Pre-crisis	period	:	1	January	2005	–	31	July	2007
CDS spreads CDSIR 5 3 18 4
CDS spreads EIR 3 3 3 21
CDSIR EIR 4 4 0 22
  crisis	period	:	1	august	2007	–	31	December	2009
CDS spreads CDSIR 18 2 7 3
CDS spreads EIR 6 6 0 18





the sample may cause a change in the bank’s MIR, even 
if its own market price did not change. Second, for given 
(credit  risk  information  obtained  from)  market  prices  of 
the firms in the reference sample used to construct the 
MIRs, a change in the long-term ratings of (a substantial   
number of) other firms in the reference sample may change 
the bank’s MIR without a change in its underlying market 
price.  Hence,  the  combination  of  different  information 
sources  (long-term  ratings  and  credit  risk  information 
obtained  from  market  prices)  into  a  relative  measure  of 
credit risk may explain why the MIRs of our sample banks 
may move earlier than the underlying market prices do.
To shed light on this issue, we perform a Granger causality 
tests to check whether lagged values of one variable help 
to predict the other variables by running a simple vector 
auto-regression (VAR) for each bank separately. More pre-
cisely, a VAR is a linear model of n-equations, n-variables 
(n=3 in our case). In this system, each variable is explained 
by its own lagged values, plus the current and past values 
of the other n-1 variables. The explicit VAR specification 
used in this analysis expresses each variable as a linear 
function  of  its  own  past  values,  the  past  values  of  all 
other variables and a serially uncorrelated error term.  (1)   
Hence, this specification allows to capture the lead-lag 
relationship  between  CDS  spreads,  CDSIRs  and  EIRs.   
The Granger causality test corresponds to testing whether 
the relevant sets of coefficients are zero. For example, if 
EIRs help to predict CDS spreads, then the coefficients on 
the lags of EIRs will be significantly different from zero 
in the equation of the VAR system where CDS spreads   
are the dependent variable. 
Table 2 summarizes the Granger-causality test results. In 
particular,  the  first  two  columns  report  the  number  of 
banks in our sample of 30 banks, for which the hypothesis 
that one indicator Granger-causes the other cannot be 
rejected at 5 p.c. level of significance. The third column 
reports  the  number  of  banks  for  which  the  causality 
between  two  indicators  is  running  both  ways,  i.e.  for 
which  a  significant  non-contemporaneous  relationship 
exists but the direction of causation runs in both ways.  (2)
The last column reports the number of banks for which 
there is no Granger-causality link between the indicators 
considered, i.e. no significant non-contemporaneous rela-
tionship can be detected for these banks.
This table reveals that for a majority of the banks in our 
sample there is a significant non-contemporaneous rela-
tionship between changes in CDS spreads and changes in 
CDSIRs. Given that CDSIRs are derived from CDS spreads 
and long-term ratings, this may not seem very surprising. 
In contrast, there is only weak evidence for relationships 
between CDS spread changes and EIR changes, and no 
significant relationship between these variables for more 
than half of the banks in our sample. Finally, there appears 
to  be  virtually  no  non-contemporaneous  relationship 
between CDSIR changes and EIR changes. 
Turning to the direction of causality in those relationships 
found to be significant, we find that CDS spreads are quite 
often leading CDSIRs, especially during the crisis period. 
This implies that during the crisis, CDS spreads were signal-
ling credit risk (or other factors, such as increased inves-
tors’ risk aversion) earlier than CDSIRs did. With respect to 
changes in CDS spreads and changes in EIRs, Table 2 shows 
that the number of banks for which the former is leading 
the latter always equals the number of banks for which the 
opposite is true. Finally, for the very few banks that have 
a significant non-contemporaneous relationship between 
changes in CDSIRs and changes in EIRs, we find no clear 
direction in which indicator is leading the other.
Overall, these observations suggest that differences in the 
movement of CDSIRs and EIRs discussed in Sections 2 and 3 
cannot be explained by some difference in the timing with 
which MIRs reflect the market information on individual 
credit risk. 
5.  Concluding remarks
In the past decade there has been an increasing focus 
on financial instability and its early detection as an input 
to  policy  decisions.  The  recent  financial  crisis,  its  high 
costs  and  the  importance  of  macro-financial  factors 
has  revealed  the  need  to  strengthen  macro-prudential 
supervision.  One  of  the  objectives  of  macro-prudential   
supervision is to monitor the cyclical and structural trends 
in financial markets so as to identify signals and measures 
of  potential  vulnerabilities  in  the  financial  system  in  a 
timely manner. Hence, a related policy question is what 
instruments or variables might constitute reliable indica-
tors of emerging risks.
Market-implied  ratings  have  been  recently  introduced 
by  rating  agencies  as  indicators  of  credit  risk  that 
include information on credit risk from the market, but 
are more stable than prices and are based on a scale   
(the traditional rating scale) which can be easily under-
stood. For these reasons, market-implied ratings appear 
(1)  For each bank, we use 5 daily lags for each variable in the equations. The results 
do not vary significantly if we use a specification where, for each bank, the 
number of lags is selected using the Bayesian information criterion, which selects 
the best fitting model, that is the best number of lags to be estimated for each 
bank. 
(2)  In this case, the results are hard to interpret and further analysis is required. It 
could be that the series are driven by a common third process at different lags.173
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to be used by central banks, financial institutions and 
investors  as  a  complement  to  long-term  ratings  and 
market  prices  to  monitor  the  financial  condition  of 
banks.  From  a  macro-prudential  point  of  view,  it  is 
interesting to ask whether such indicators offer a more 
precise measure of credit risk than e.g. CDS spreads, and 
whether  information  about  credit  risk  is  incorporated 
into one of the market-implied ratings (CDS-implied or 
equity-implied) more quickly than in the other or than in 
market prices (CDS spreads).
This  article  addresses  these  questions  by  analysing  the 
behaviour of market-implied ratings over a period cover-
ing the run-up to the crisis and the crisis period itself. 
The available evidence seems to suggest that MIRs are 
unlikely to fully overcome the deficiencies of their underly-
ing components (long-term ratings and market prices). In 
particular, the behaviour of MIRs obtained from the CDS 
market and those obtained from the equity market does 
not  always  coincide.  That  is,  the  relationship  between 
CDSIRs and EIRs is time-varying. In addition, the two types 
of MIRs also seem to differ somewhat in their relationship 
to CDS spreads. Correlations between changes in CDSIRs 
and EIRs are low, and there seems to be no lead-lag rela-
tionship between the changes in these variables, suggest-
ing that the low correlations are not due to differences 
in the speeds at which CDS and equity markets reflect 
information relating to credit risk. 
Instead,  the  movements  in  CDSIRs  and  EIRs  seem  to 
reflect movements in the underlying prices in CDS and 
equity markets, although these movements may not be 
driven only by factors related to credit risk. 
This article represents a first step in analyzing the behav-
iour  of  MIRs  and  suggests  several  avenues  for  further 
research. A natural question which arises from the results 
is what drives the seemingly unrelated movements some-
times observed in the MIRs. Is the main driver increased 
credit risk ? Are there methodological reasons suggesting 
that  MIRs  should  not  be  expected  to  offer  equivalent 
measures of credit risk ? To what extent do factors unre-
lated to credit risk, such as risk premia, liquidity premia, or 
bank-specific characteristics affect the MIRs ? 174
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Source  : Own calculations based on data from Datastream.
Appendix